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Traditionally, when a defendant  nds itself being sued in a class action lawsuit, there are two avenues
for removal to federal court: traditional diversity grounds and federal question grounds.  The
implementation of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) provides additional avenues for accomplishing
removal.
I. Parameters
With the enactment of CAFA, Congress signi cantly expanded federal courts’ jurisdiction over class
actions and mass actions. The primary CAFA provisions are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(B). This
section de nes a class action under CAFA as “any civil action  led under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought
by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.”  It is important to note that the class action
must have been brought by the plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or a similar state
statute using the typical class action language (commonality, typicality, numerosity, and so on).  If the
action is brought under some other statute, it is not removable under CAFA, but may be removable under
diversity or federal question grounds.
The most important points about CAFA removal and jurisdiction involve a relaxed diversity requirement
and a heightened amount in controversy requirement. Under CAFA, a removing defendant must only
show that at least one plaintiff is diverse from at least one defendant instead of showing complete
diversity.  CAFA also increased the amount in controversy requirement from $75,000 to $5 million, and
the $5 million amount can now be satis ed by aggregating each plaintiff’s claim amount—something not
permitted under traditional diversity rules.  The amount in controversy can be shown by demonstrating
several types of damages, including compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages, as well as equitable
relief.  Attorney’s fees can also be included when authorized by statute. 
There are differences among circuits when it comes to the burden of establishing the amount in
controversy. In the Fourth Circuit, the defendant must establish the jurisdictional amount by a
preponderance of the evidence when damages are unspeci ed, as opposed to the legal certainty a
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plaintiff enjoys when initially invoking federal jurisdiction by  ling in federal court.  In the Seventh
Circuit, courts employ a legal impossibility standard which makes this circuit very removal-friendly.  In
the Tenth Circuit, a defendant will satisfy the amount in controversy requirement if it can show the
amount is not legally certain to be less than the jurisdictional amount.
CAFA and traditional diversity jurisdiction can be plead in a removal proceeding in the alternative.  In
addition to expanding federal class action jurisdiction under CAFA, Congress also simply provided an
additional method for class action removal, as the multiple avenues for removal are not mutually
exclusive. Moreover, a class does not yet have to be certi ed in order for defendants to remove under
CAFA.  Similarly, post-removal events such as denial of class certi cation do not divest the court of
jurisdiction.
Traditional methods for determining citizenship apply under CAFA; however, there is one exception. 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) provides that an unincorporated association is “a citizen of the State where it has
its principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is organized.”   This is the standard
generally reserved for corporations under traditional removal statutes.
II. Primary Exceptions/Exclusions
There are certain class actions and subject matters that that cannot be removed under CAFA. These
excepted actions include claims arising solely under:
A covered security as de ned by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934;
Relation to the internal affairs or governance of a corporation or other business entity and brought
under the laws of the state in which the business entity is organized or incorporated; or
Relation to the rights, duties and obligations related to any security as de ned by the Securities Act
of 1933 and associated regulations.
There are three other exceptions under CAFA that require or allow a federal court to decline jurisdiction.
These three exceptions include (1) the home state controversy exception,  (2) the local controversy
exception,  and (3) the interest of justice exception.  The home state controversy exception
mandates federal courts decline jurisdiction if two-thirds or more of the members of a proposed plaintiff
class and the primary defendants are citizens of the state where the action was originally  led.  The
local controversy exception mandates federal courts decline jurisdiction where several criteria are met:
Greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes are citizens of the state in
which the class action was originally  led;
At least one defendant is a defendant:
From whom signi cant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class;
Whose alleged conduct forms a signi cant basis for the claims asserted; and
Who is a citizen of the state in which the action was originally  led.
The principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct were incurred in the State in which the
action was originally  led; and
During the three year period preceding the  ling of the class action, no other class action has been
 led asserting the same or similar allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same
or other persons.
The interest of justice exception, sometimes called the discretionary exception, allows a federal court to
decline jurisdiction when greater than one-third, but less than two-thirds, of the members of the
proposed plaintiff class and the primary defendants are citizens of the state in which the class action
was originally  led.  The court may do so after considering the following factors:
Whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest;
Whether the claims asserted will be governed by the laws of the state where the action was
originally  led or by the laws of other states;














If the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus to the class members, alleged harm, or
defendants;
The number of citizens of the state in which the action was originally  led in all proposed plaintiff
classes is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other state, and the citizenship
of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of states.
Additionally, should there exist a statutory bar to removal separate from the CAFA provisions, it is clear
in most circuits that those removal bars will apply to bar removal under CAFA. In other words, CAFA’s
removal statute does not seem to impliedly repeal other statutory bars,  although there could be room
to argue this is not the case. For example, in Passarella v. Ginn Co., the court held that the bar to
removal under 15 U.S.C. § 1719, dealing with the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA) was
impliedly repealed by CASA because CASA was more recently enacted and provided a more general
removal right for qualifying class actions.
III. Pitfalls and Special Considerations
The following includes some pitfalls and special considerations that may be encountered when
removing a CAFA class action to federal court:
Plaintiffs attempt to plead around CAFA jurisdiction in many ways—some of these are permitted and
some are not. First, plaintiffs are not permitted to disclaim a recovery greater than $5 million prior to
class certi cation in order to avoid CAFA jurisdiction.  Regarding splitting up a class action into
several smaller class actions, circuits are divided. The Sixth Circuit suggests that this practice
would be allowed if the segmentation was not arbitrary and not meant to solely frustrate CAFA,
while the Eighth Circuit holds that aggregation of amounts from separate class actions is not
permitted because the statutory language of CAFA did not contemplate such a scenario.
Plaintiffs can permissibly structure the putative class in a way that will invoke either the local
controversy or home state controversy exceptions described.
The law is unclear when determining whether a federal judge must dismiss or remand to state court
when they realize neither they nor the state court have jurisdiction, making remand futile. This
debate is centered on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) which states that a case shall be remanded if it appears
the court lacks jurisdiction prior to  nal judgment. The First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have
recognized the “futility exception” which supports dismissal rather than remand of a case that lacks
viable state claims.  Other circuits have rejected the “futility exception” and support a more literal
read of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  If a defendant is in the latter group, they could end up having to re-
litigate the dispositive  nding that a class plaintiff lacks jurisdiction, wasting time and money.
CAFA provides that a district court’s order denying CAFA jurisdiction is appealable— this is a large
departure from traditional rules regarding the appealability of remand orders.
There are several traditional removal rules that do not apply when a class action is removed under
CAFA. Therefore, if defense counsel is attempting to remove under multiple bases, they will need to
ensure that the traditional rules are satis ed. These rules include (1) the requirement that removal
happen within one year, (2) the rule that no defendant can be a citizen of the forum state, and (3) the
rule that all defendants must consent to removal.
Finally, it can be counter-intuitive for removing counsel to tally potential damages in order to reach
the $5 million threshold for CAFA jurisdiction, especially when it comes to punitive damages.
Putting statements on the record that punitive or other damages may exist that the plaintiff class
has not alleged can be dangerous. It is also obviously not a position any attorney wants to put their
client in, regardless of whether or not these statements are legally binding.
IV. Conclusion
CAFA is still in its infancy, and there is still much to be learned and gaps will continue to be discovered.
The above points are only some of the issues to be considered when attempting to remove a class
action to federal court through CAFA. Always consult the rules in your circuit prior to determining
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